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WHO IS AFRAID OF PERPETUAL TRUSTS? 
Bridget J. Crawford* 
Introduction 
Throw a stone into a room full of law professors, and it is virtually im-
possible to hit someone who will defend perpetual trusts. Yet since 1995, 
eighteen states have repealed their rules against perpetuities, and there are 
now twenty-one states that permit trusts to last forever. Many academics 
have responded with a virtual pile-on, calling the repeals a “race to the bot-
tom”1 at best and “loony”2 at worst. Lawrence Waggoner, Professor 
Emeritus at the University of Michigan School of Law and Reporter for the 
Restatement (Third) of Property: Wills and Other Donative Transfers, has 
made another contribution to the scrum.3 Professor Waggoner does not just 
dislike perpetual trusts. They are, in his description, “folly.” 
Professor Waggoner nominally aims his critique at wealthy individuals 
who desire perpetual trusts and the lawmakers who enable them by passing 
favorable legislation. He lodges five specific objections: (1) after a certain 
period of time, the beneficiaries of perpetual trusts will be insufficiently re-
lated to the trust creator; (2) after a certain period of time, there will be too 
many beneficiaries of a perpetual trust; (3) perpetual trusts will be expensive 
to manage; (4) outdated trust instruments will hamper management of per-
petual trusts; and (5) trustee turnover will negatively impact perpetual trusts. 
This Essay considers each of his objections in turn, and concludes that Pro-
fessor Waggoner’s concerns are misplaced and exaggerated. Perpetual trusts 
raise important policy concerns, to be sure, but “folly” is in the eye of the 
beholder. The legal system does not yet have enough experience with per-
petual trusts to understand their full implications. A more prudent approach 
would be to embrace a variation on the long-standing approach to perpetui-
ties problems: let’s wait and see.  
I. The Promulgation of the Perpetual Trust 
Professor Waggoner begins his essay with an explanation of the origins of 
the perpetual trust movement. Like most lawyers, lawmakers and academics, 
                                                                                                                      
 * Professor of Law, Pace University. B.A. Yale University. J.D. University of Penn-
sylvania Law School. For helpful conversations and comments, I thank Ray Madoff, Jeffrey 
Cooper, Joshua Tate and Robert Sitkoff. The opinions expressed in this Essay are mine alone. 
 1. See, e.g., Stewart E. Sterk, Asset Protection Trusts: Trust Law’s Race to the Bot-
tom?, 85 Cornell L. Rev. 1035 (2000). 
 2. Mark L. Ascher, But I Thought the Earth Belonged to the Living, 89 Tex. L. Rev. 
1149, 1160 (2011). 
 3. Lawrence W. Waggoner, From Here to Eternity: The Folly of Perpetual Trusts, Univ. 
of Mich. L. Sch. Pub. L. & Legal Theory Working Paper Series No. 529, Dec. 2011, available 
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1975117. 
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Professor Waggoner frames the generation-skipping transfer (“GST”) tax 
exemption as the “spark” for the rise of the perpetual trust. Generally speak-
ing, the GST tax is an extra wealth transfer tax imposed—in addition to the 
gift tax or estate tax—on transfers to beneficiaries two or more generations 
below the giver. Each taxpayer has a certain exemption from GST, and if the 
exemption fully “covers” transfers to a particular trust, the trust assets will 
be forever free from GST tax, no matter how large the trust grows. Max 
Schanzenbach and Robert Sitkoff’s empirical research on state trust busi-
ness makes a persuasive case that the desire to forever shield transfers from 
the GST was the catalyst for perpetual trusts.4 Mary Louise Fellows adds 
further context, describing the “dry tinder on which that spark [of GST] fell” 
as an historic tolerance for dead-hand control, donor-centric trusts laws, leg-
islative simplification of the common-law rule against perpetuities, and the 
commercialization of estate planning.5 To that list, one should add the in-
crease in the number of ultra-wealthy individuals—i.e., those who could 
afford to “give away” the amount covered by the GST exemption, by fund-
ing an irrevocable trust for grandchildren and more remote descendants.6 
The perpetual trust became popular in an era of increasing cultural con-
servatism and anti-tax sentiment.7 The Reagan era’s embrace of “trickle-down 
economics” included the introduction of the lowest income tax rates in dec-
ades, but also increased awareness of the importance of available exclusions 
and exemptions, such as the GST.8 Tax sensitivity on the part of the ordinary 
citizen made George H.W. Bush’s campaign proclamation “Read my lips—
no new taxes” one of the most recognizable catchphrases of the late 1990s. I 
am persuaded, as Professor Waggoner is, by the evidence presented by 
Schanzenbach and Sitkoff. But for the GST, perpetual trusts would not have 
become popular. At the same time, though, the perpetual trust movement 
needs to be understood in the larger social and economic context of cultural 
and fiscal conservatism. 
                                                                                                                      
 4. Robert H. Sitkoff & Max M. Schanzenbach, Jurisdictional Competition for Trust 
Funds: An Empirical Analysis of Perpetuities and Taxes, 115 Yale L.J. 356, 410 (2005); Max 
M. Schanzenbach & Robert H. Sitkoff, Perpetuities or Taxes? Explaining the Rise of the Per-
petual Trust, 27 Cardozo L. Rev. 2465, 2466 (2006). 
 5. Mary Louise Fellows, Why the Generation-Skipping Transfer Tax Sparked Perpetu-
al Trusts, 27 Cardozo L. Rev. 2511, 2511 & 2518–2519 (2006). 
 6. See Kevin Phillips, The Politics of Rich and Poor: Wealth and the Ameri-
can Electorate in the Reagan Aftermath 239 (Appendix A) (1990) (citing Thomas J. 
Stealey, Marketing to the Affluent (1988) (number of centamillionaires in the U.S. 
increased from 700 in 1985 to 900 in 1986 and 1200 in 1987)). 
 7. See Michael J. Graetz, 100 Million Unnecessary Returns: A Simple, Fair, 
and Competitive Tax Plan for the United States 35–42 (2008) (describing anti-tax 
sentiment). 
 8. One estate planning attorney testified before Congress in 1984 that the proposed 
changes to the GST, later enacted in 1986, would lead to the proliferation of trusts designed to 
take maximum advantage of the GST exemption. Generation-Skipping Transfer Tax: Hearings 
Before the H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 98th Cong. 335, 336 (1984) (testimony of Ray-
mond Young) cited in Schanzenbach & Sitkoff, supra note 4, at 2477. 
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II. Fear Not the Perpetual Trust 
A. Degree of Relatedness 
Professor Waggoner’s first critique of perpetual trusts—i.e., that over 
time, beneficiaries will bear a diminishing blood quantum tie to the trust’s 
settlor—is somewhat misleading. He writes: 
With each step down the generational ladder, the settlor’s genetic rela-
tionship with the descendant-beneficiaries will decline rather 
precipitously. . . . At the 14th generation (i.e., the generation born about 
300 years after the settlor’s death), the settlor’s genetic relationship is re-
duced to about 0.0061 per cent, which—due to our common origins—is 
about the same relationship one has with any randomly selected member 
of the population.9 
While Professor Waggoner’s mathematics is sound enough, degree of re-
lationship between trust grantor and beneficiary has no relevance to a 
trusts’s validity. There is no aspect of trust or other law that requires a trust’s 
beneficiaries to be related to the settlor within a certain degree of consan-
guinity, if at all. Presumably Professor Waggoner does not object to the 
perpetual nature of charitable trusts on the grounds that the beneficiaries are 
insufficiently “related” to the settlor. Indeed, one of the tests for determining 
whether a trust has a valid charitable purpose is whether it is “sufficiently 
beneficial to the community” by relieving poverty, advancing education, 
religion, health or another governmental purpose.10 In other words, a chari-
table trust’s beneficiaries must be sufficiently unrelated to the settlor.11 
Instead of disallowing private express perpetual trusts, as Professor Wag-
goner would favor, a more moderate approach would be to import from the 
charitable trust context the doctrine of cy pres. This would allow a court to 
reform a trust if the original trust purposes can no longer be accomplished.12  
Professor Waggoner’s blood-quantum objection lacks a readily accessible 
logic and is hampered by negative associations with the history of blood-
quantum laws in the United States.13 Unfortunately, Professor Waggoner’s 
                                                                                                                      
 9. Waggoner, supra note 3, at 5. 
 10. Jesse Dukeminier et al., Wills, Trusts, and Estates 757 (8th ed. 2009) (“To 
be classified as charitable, a trust must be for the relief of poverty or for the advancement of 
education, religion, health, or governmental or other purposes that is sufficiently beneficial to 
the community to justify the preferential treatment afforded to a charitable trust.”). See also 
Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 28 (2003). 
 11. See Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 28 cmt. a(1) (2003) (trust for education of 
settlor’s descendants is not a charitable trust). Cf. United Bank v. Blosser, 624 S.E.2d 815 
(W.Va. 2005) (a trust providing scholarships to members of the family of the settlor is charita-
ble). 
 12. Dukeminier et al., supra note 10, at 760–776. Professor Sitkoff, the current au-
thor of the Dukeminier text, suggests that cy pres doctrine might serve as a template for future 
modification of perpetual trusts. Id. at 899–900.  
 13. See Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, 25 USCA § 461 et seq. (recommending, 
among other things, certain formal tribal structures be created to recognize tribe membership 
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rhetoric obscures a more legitimate concern about the extent of a grantor’s 
understanding that most future trust beneficiaries will be virtual strangers. 
Of course, if this is the objection, then the solution is not to ban all perpetual 
trusts, but rather to implement safeguards to ensure that potential grantors 
are aware of the tenuous family ties that future beneficiaries may have.  
Professor Waggoner’s opposition to perpetual trusts unquestioningly in-
ternalizes anti-perpetuity sentiments from the Victorian era and before. 
Historically, durational limits on trusts were explained as desire to minimize 
so-called “dead hand” control. In this analysis, the law permits entrustment 
as an appropriate extension of a grantor’s moral right to decide what is best 
for those beneficiaries that he knows personally.14 Under these mores, a pa-
ter familias is better positioned than the law to direct a trust’s resources. 
Such patriarchal authority remains superior to the law only as far as the 
grantor’s knowledge extends—that is, not indefinitely.  
Perhaps in proverbially simpler times, this justification had greater pur-
chase. A more modern view might consider that trusts do not necessarily 
prevent beneficiaries from accessing wealth, but rather preserve wealth in an 
otherwise litigious era. In other words, twenty-first century trusts might 
function less as mechanisms for controlling trust beneficiaries than for 
shielding assets from claims by others (including the government in the 
form of taxes). Future research would be important in understanding the 
modern purpose and function of the private express trust. If it is true that the 
perpetual trust is more a vehicle for wealth preservation than wealth direc-
tion, then the settlor’s strong blood relatedness (or lack thereof) to the bene-
beneficiaries does no meaningful work in Professor Waggoner’s theory. To 
be sure, perpetual trusts carry more than a whiff of the quixotic quest for 
immortality15 or at least for a name as resonant as Carnegie, Rockefeller, or 
Gates. But striving is a great American tradition. 
                                                                                                                      
based on blood quantum). Perhaps the most notable example in recent years is the effort by the 
Cherokee establishment to deny tribe membership to descendants of African and African-
American slaves known as the “Cherokee Freedmen.” See, e.g., Nash v. Cherokee Nation 
(D.D.C. 2011), http://www.cherokee.org/Docs/Org2010/2011/10/32733NashfedordtransNDOkla. 
pdf. See generally S. Alan Ray, A Race or a Nation? Cherokee National Identity and the Status of 
Freedmen's Descendants, 12 Mich. J. Race & L. 387 (2007). There is also the painful legacy 
of segregationist “one-drop” rules that were used systematically for centuries to deprive Afri-
can-American people of rights. See Daniel J. Sharfstein, Crossing the Color Line: Racial 
Migration and the One-Drop Rule, 1600–1860, 91 Minn. L. Rev. 592 (2006). Professor Wag-
goner’s objection is a sort of reverse—a “not enough drops” rule—for deciding when a trust is 
somehow no longer justified, in his estimation. 
 14. Arthur Hobhouse, The Dead Hand: Addresses on the Subject of Endow-
ments and Settlements of Property 188 (1880) (“A clear, obvious, natural line is drawn 
for us between those persons and events which the Settlor knows and sees, and those which he 
cannot know and see. Within the former province we may trust his natural affections and his 
capacity of judgment to make better dispositions than any external Law is likely to make for 
him.”). 
 15. See, e.g., Ray Madoff, Immortality and the Law: The Rising Power of the 
American Dead (2010). 
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B. Number of Trust Beneficiaries 
Professor Waggoner’s second critique of perpetual trusts is that over 
time, they will have too many beneficiaries. He forecasts that “after 350 
years, [the trust would have] about 114,500 beneficiaries... The beneficiar-
ies, each with standing to bring a lawsuit against the trustee for violation of 
any of the trustee’s fiduciary duties, would have to book Rungrado May Day 
Stadium in Pyongyang North Korea or Salt Lake Stadium in Kolkata India 
for a meeting.”16 
His mathematics are accurate enough. Again, though, Professor Wag-
goner’s critique seems from another era. Nineteenth-century lawyers could 
not have imagined twenty-first-century facts. But laws of procedure can and 
do adapt to changed circumstances. To object to perpetual trusts on the 
grounds that a traditional in-person meeting of beneficiaries would be diffi-
cult is to allow the tail of stadium seating to wag the dog of donative 
transfers. The two should have nothing to do with each other. Procedure 
must serve, not limit, contemporary trust practice. Professor Waggoner’s 
objections to trusts with large numbers of beneficiaries do not ring true giv-
en that there are a variety of mechanisms—guardians ad litem, virtual 
representation or use of a “qualified beneficiary,”17 to name just a few—that 
could be deployed in the administration of perpetual trusts, if procedures 
permitted.  
What Professor Waggoner seems to truly lament is the loss of the per-
sonal relationship between wealthy individuals and their bankers that would 
have been more common in bygone eras. Professor Waggoner is working 
with an idealized model in which the personnel at the local bank know their 
wealthy clients and the clients’ families on a personal level. What he seems 
to have difficulty imagining are modern banking relationships in the internet 
era. The heyday of face-to-face banking, even for the ultra-wealthy, is long 
past. One is likely to be far more familiar with the location of the closest 
automatic teller machine than the schedule of a particular bank officer at the 
closest brick-and-mortar bank. In that sense, there is a shot of disingenuous-
ness throughout Professor Waggoner’s argument. With respect to the vast 
majority of trusts—not just perpetual trusts—institutional trustees of the 
twenty-first century are large corporate entities with thousands and thou-
sands of trusts under management, with day-to-day work on all but the 
largest of trusts being handled by 9-to-5 employees with no personal rela-
tionship to the trust settlor. That the trust officers do not know all of the 
beneficiaries of the trusts that they administer is merely a fact of modern 
fiduciary practice, not an argument against perpetual trusts. 
                                                                                                                      
 16. Waggoner, supra note 3, at 7. 
 17. See, e.g., Davis v. U.S. Bank National Association, 243 S.W.3d 425 (Mo. Ct. App. 
2007) (use of “qualified beneficiaries” to represent other beneficial interest-holders). 
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C. Managerial Costs 
Professor Waggoner’s third objection is that perpetual trusts raise intrac-
table management problems. He envisions that “[a]s the settlor’s descending 
line divides and redivides into hundreds and then thousands of branches, the 
trustee would have to employ and assign more and more trust officers, each 
with primary operational responsibility—aided by ever-advancing technolo-
gies—for a manageable number of branches.”18 Whether this is true, 
however, remains to be seen. As Professor Waggoner himself notes, each 
perpetual trust is different. He imagines a trust that requires subdivision up-
on the termination of the life of each preceding beneficiary in the bloodline. 
Many perpetual trusts, however, are structured as “pot” trusts for the benefit 
of the settlor’s descendants living from time to time. With these trusts, the 
division and redivision imagined by Professor Waggoner never occurs. Even if 
a trustee, either of a pot trust or a separate share trust, exercises a decanting 
power to “divide and redivide the original trust into sub-trusts,” as Professor 
Waggoner acknowledges could happen, it is not necessarily true that each 
subtrust would be assigned a single trust officer to feed and care for the trust 
on a daily basis.  
Professor Waggoner underestimates the efficiencies in complex trust 
administration. Common trust funds are a mainstay of most banks and trust 
companies having a significant portfolio of fiduciary business. These funds 
facilitate collective investment across multiple small trusts. Furthermore, as 
any trust officer could testify, the amount of time required to administer any 
particular trust is not necessarily correlated to the number of beneficiaries 
that the trust has. Some trusts with few beneficiaries require a great deal of 
administrative time; other trusts with a large number of beneficiaries require 
minimal administrative time. If Professor Waggoner’s concern is the cost of 
disseminating information to trust beneficiaries, that concern is easily ad-
dressed in the electronic age by email and password-protected websites. In 
an odd sense, it is possible that a trust with a huge number of beneficiaries 
could be the easiest for a professional trust company to serve. A beneficiary 
with a one-one-thousandth interest in a particular trust’s income likely will 
demand very little from the trustee. Each prospective trustee should have the 
freedom to make an independent business decision about taking on the ad-
ministration of a perpetual (or other) trust. These sophisticated institutions 
do not need academics and uniform law commissioners to protect them from 
poor decision-making.  
Professor Waggoner appears incredulous that state legislators might 
have understood the potential complexities when they voted to permit per-
petual trusts. Three times in his relatively short essay, Professor Waggoner 
overtly questions lawmakers’ motives and competence. Consider: 
I ask for a third time, this time in a slightly different way: If the foregoing 
projections [about numbers of beneficiaries] and other concerns had been 
before them, would the state legislators still have been convinced that it is 
                                                                                                                      
 18. Waggoner, supra note 3, at 10–11. 
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good public policy to authorize perpetual trusts, and would the wealthy 
still have been convinced that the tax advantages are worth putting them in 
place?19 
These passages are problematic in at least two respects. First, Professor 
Waggoner decries the involvement of “state banking groups and estate-
planning attorneys”20 in perpetual trust legislation, as if other legislative 
processes were free from all exogenous influences. It strains credulity to 
suggest that legislators who voted to abolish effectively the Rule Against 
Perpetuities in more than twenty states21 were duped by a group of lawyers 
and bankers. If so, then lawmakers in some of the same states, along with 
others, were similarly “duped” (by academics and other law reformers) into 
enacting the Uniform Trust Code.  
Law professors are one of the engines that power these supposedly neu-
tral law reform groups that Professors Max Schanzenbach and Robert 
Sitkoff have identified one of the sources of “top down” reform of the law of 
trusts and estates.22 Academic insiders will claim that they—unlike estate 
planners and bankers—have no financial stake in the legislation they pro-
pose. This is true insofar as most law professors do not depend on income 
from the practice of law to earn a living. But successful law reform efforts 
redound to the reputational benefit of the faculty members involved. After 
all, to the professor who has not chosen his career primarily for the money, 
bragging rights might be more valuable than any bankers’ and lawyer’s fees.  
Professor Waggoner’s critique of bankers’ and lawyers’ involvement is a 
thinly-veiled accusation of interest capture.23 Given Professor Waggoner’s 
involvement with legal reform institutions such as the American Law Insti-
tute, it would seem that some interest capture (by supposedly neutral law 
reform projects) is acceptable to Professor Waggoner, but other interest cap-
ture (by bankers and lawyers for ultra-wealthy individuals) is unacceptable. 
If indeed lawmakers are as uninformed and unthinking as Professor Wag-
goner suspects, then adoption of the Uniform Trust Code, for example, is as 
deeply problematic as is perpetual trust legislation. To be sure, a more mod-
erate critique is that bankers and lawyers have a direct financial interest in the 
perpetual trust industry, whereas law professors and law reformers either have 
non-monetary interests (e.g., ego and professional satisfaction) or interests not 
                                                                                                                      
 19. Id. at 13–14. 
 20. Id. at 3. Here I adopt Max Schanzenbach and Robert Sitkoff’s definition of aboli-
tion as “any modification of the Rule that would allow for a perpetual trust of intangible 
personal property or that so lengthened the perpetuities period that I no longer represents a 
practical constraint on trust duration.” Schanzenbach & Sitkoff, supra note 4, at 2466 n.1. 
 21. The states allowing perpetual trusts are: Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Delaware, 
D.C., Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, New 
Hampshire, New Jersey, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota, 
Tennessee, Utah, Virginia, Wisconsin and Wyoming. 
 22. See Max M. Schanzenbach & Robert Sitkoff, The Prudent Investor Rule and Trust 
Asset Allocation: An Emprical Analysis, 35 ACTEC Journal 314, 314 & 318 (2010). 
 23. See, e.g., Larry E. Ribstein, Lawyers as Lawmakers: A Theory of Lawyer Licensing, 
69 Mo. L. Rev. 299, 299 (2004). 
Crawford MLR FI FTP_3.doc 7/30/2012 4:05 PM 
86 Michigan Law Review First Impressions [Vol. 111:79 
subject to ready quantification (e.g., enhanced professional reputation). But 
interest capture is an inapposite critique. 
The second significant problem with Professor Waggoner’s analysis of 
the legislative process here is that he seems to imply that the “real” benefi-
ciaries of perpetual trusts uniquely are lawyers and bankers. I suspect that 
both Professor Waggoner and I would agree that any trust law is undesirable 
if it financially benefits bankers and lawyers to the exclusion of trust benefi-
ciaries. It is not immediately obvious that lawyers and bankers benefit more 
from setting up perpetual trusts than other trusts. But it is not clear that the 
provision of any—or even a significant—financial benefit to bankers and 
lawyers in the form of professional fees or commissions is a meaningful 
objection to the existence of perpetual trusts. To make a loose analogy, class 
action lawyers typically benefit (in the form of legal fees) more than any one 
individual member of the represented class. But that is no objection to the 
existence of class actions themselves. A potential long-term benefit of per-
petual trusts to legal or banking professionals is no more valid an objection 
to perpetual trusts. Presumably if perpetual trusts were not created in the 
first place, then lawyers and bankers would be just as busy—and generating 
the same level of fees—in marketing other types of trusts to future genera-
tions. Perhaps Professor Waggoner’s critique is of a “bottom up”24 law 
reform movement powered by lawyers and bankers that moved faster and 
more nimbly than any “top down” group has.  
D. Outmoded Trust Instruments 
Aging is inevitable; this is true for both people and legal documents. 
Professor Waggoner predicts that trust documents will not fare well with 
age: “If the past is any guide to the future, an early 21st century perpetual-
trust document will seem as obsolete to those in distant centuries as a 17th 
century document appears to us today.”25 From architecture to zeppelins, 
that which seems modern at any one point almost certainly will not seem so 
in the future. Still, it is equally true that legal documents, including trusts, 
can be valid, enforceable and effective without being à la mode.  
As an initial matter, note that one cannot predict the duration of any trust 
with certainty. As Professor Waggoner himself notes, “Some model perpetu-
al-trust documents incorporate an escape clause in the form of a nongeneral 
power of appointment granted to each descendant-beneficiary to appoint his 
or her share of trust principal outright to his or her descendants.”26 It is not 
unusual for long-term trusts to have such a provision, and so with many per-
petual trusts, each generation of beneficiaries will have the ability to decide 
whether to continue the trust or not. Just because a perpetual trust can last 
forever does not mean that it will. Indeed there is anecdotal evidence to sug-
gest that grantors of perpetual trusts recognize the need for future flexibility 
                                                                                                                      
 24. See Schanzenbach & Sitkoff, supra note 22. 
 25. Waggoner, supra note 3, at 11–12. 
 26. Id. at n.27. 
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and plan for it by granting powers of appointment.27 By allowing individual 
beneficiaries to weigh the benefits and burdens of continuing the trust in the 
future, many perpetual trusts contemplate the control of wealth by the liv-
ing. This is precisely what Professor Waggoner is after. 
Apart from a flexible trust instrument, smooth trust administration is en-
abled by legal rules that allow for flexible construction and interpretation in 
accordance with the mores of the time. In such a climate, a trust instrument 
that might seem obsolete in future centuries (in terms of the language it uses 
or the paper it written on) need not be obsolete. Capacious rules make for 
greater agility on the part of both trustees and courts. It therefore is for fu-
ture generations of lawyers to propose modifications or improvements to 
trust doctrine in order to ensure that courts have the flexibility to give effect 
to perpetual (or other) trusts drafted long before. The dead hand attempting 
to control the future might well belong to those who would curb the use of 
these trusts right now. 
E. Trustee Turnover 
Professor Waggoner’s final enumerated concern is that the trustees of 
perpetual trusts inevitably will change or go out of business: 
In an era in which banks and other financial institutions go out of business, 
merge, or are taken over by other banks or financial institutions, the bank 
or financial institution originally selected will not likely continue in any-
thing like its present form for the next 200 years, 300 years, or for 
eternity.28  
It is true that one can have a greater degree of confidence that any one par-
ticular financial institution will be in existence one year from now than five 
hundred years from now. It is unlikely that wealthy individuals are working 
under any different assumption when they create a perpetual trust. Indeed, 
many sophisticated trusts contain provisions that allow for the removal of a 
trustee—with or without cause—by a third-party trust protector or by the 
beneficiaries themselves. Trustee turnover is anticipated by the very trust 
structure in some cases. Potential turnover of trustees is not a severe enough 
potential detriment to deter people from creating and funding perpetual 
trusts. In fact, one might welcome a change in trustees as a market response 
that disciplines poor performers. A trusteeship is not a sinecure. 
III. Curbing Perpetual Trusts 
If the GST drives creation of perpetual trusts, a relatively simple legisla-
tive change would drive them out of existence. To curb perpetual trusts, 
make them subject to the GST. Congress could limit the application of the 
                                                                                                                      
 27. See, e.g., Richard W. Nenno, Planning with Perpetual Dynasty Trusts, Appendix C 
(May 13, 2004), http://meetings.abanet.org/webupload/commupload/RP582000/newsletterpubs/ 
nenno1.pdf) (perpetual trust form granting each beneficiary a limited power of appointment). 
 28. Waggoner, supra note 3, at 12. 
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GST exemption to outright transfers and transfers that will be included in 
the beneficiary’s gross estate for estate tax purposes.29 Because estate plan-
ners have enough experience with similar rules in the context of eligibility 
for the estate and gift tax marital deduction, such a GST rule would be easi-
ly understood by practitioners. Whether Congress would be receptive to 
such a change is uncertain; lawmakers might want to wait for evidence that 
Professor Waggoner’s worst predictions have come true.  
In the meantime, the American Law Institute has produced its Restate-
ment (Third) of Property: Wills and Other Donative Transfers, for which 
Professor Waggoner served as the Reporter. The Restatement (Third) pro-
poses a new Rule Against Perpetuities that would eliminate a distinction 
between contingent interests and vested interests.30 The proposed rule would 
use a “two generation” rule for trust duration, where generations are defined 
as twenty-five years and the trust creator is deemed to be 12.5 years “into” 
his or her generation. Whether that proposal has any chance of being adopt-
ed remains to be seen, but it is certainly more complicated than limiting 
application of the GST exemption.  
Of the many valid objections to perpetual trusts, Professor Waggoner 
appears to have abandoned (or ignored) most of them. Ray Madoff, for ex-
ample, has criticized perpetual trusts as the trough at which a new American 
aristocracy will feed, free of the claims of any creditors. Generally speaking, 
perpetual trusts (and most irrevocable trusts of any duration) include spend-
thrift clauses that prevent most creditors from ever reaching the 
beneficiary’s interest in the trust.31 This is true even if the beneficiary has 
caused harm to others. Because almost all long-term trusts (whether or not 
perpetual) include spendthrift provisions, Madoff’s critique has broad appli-
cation. Thus law reformers adopting Madoff’s view might want to eliminate 
spendthrift protection from all domestic trusts, or even just perpetual ones. 
Practically speaking, though, trust business currently subject to the jurisdic-
tions of United States courts likely would relocate to foreign jurisdictions 
that maintain vigorous spendthrift protection, even for self-settled trusts. 
Thus, eliminating spendthrift protection from some or all U.S.-based trusts 
will put tort victims further from justice. 
Instead of engaging with critiques offered by Madoff and others, Profes-
sor Waggoner insists that perpetual trusts are micro-manifestations of 
megalomania on the part of the uninformed rich (who themselves are the 
                                                                                                                      
 29. A proposal limiting the GST exemption to direct transfers is not new. See Staff of 
Joint Comm. on Taxation, 100th Cong., General Explanation of the Tax Reform 
Act of 1986, 1263 (Comm. Print 1987) (the purpose of federal wealth transfer taxes is “not 
only to raise revenue, but also to do so in a manner that has as nearly as possible a uniform 
effect. This policy is best served when transfer tax consequences do not vary widely depend-
ing on whether property is transferred outright to immediately succeeding generations or is 
transferred in ways that skip generations.”). 
 30. Ray Madoff, America Builds an Aristocracy, N.Y. Times, Jul. 11, 2010, at A-19. 
 31. See, e.g., Sterk, supra note 1; Phyllis C. Smith, The Estate and Gift Tax Implica-
tions of Self-Settled Domestic Asset Protection Trusts: Can You Really Have Your Cake and 
Eat It Too?, 44 N. Eng. L. Rev. 25 (2009). 
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beneficiaries of uninformed legislators). His focus on dead-hand control has 
a rich intellectual history, and indeed it is that history—and only that histo-
ry—that does any work in Professor Waggoner’s analysis. Contemporary 
perpetual trusts are better understood as wealth preservation vehicles in an 
era of relative political conservativism. Perpetual trusts are the ultimate sta-
tus symbol, the über-wealthy’s Cristal to others’ Dom Perignon. Perpetual 
trusts are a symptom, not the cause, of wealth inequality. Reducing wealth 
inequality and increasing financial literacy will require educating the public 
about taxation and its role in operating a democratic government. We should 
stop fearing perpetual trusts and turn energies to tax literacy projects32 that 
would transform “taxation” into something other than a dirty word for most 
Americans. 
Conclusion 
From the perspective of the lucky beneficiaries, perpetual trusts are a net 
economic positive. Regardless of the administrative difficulties or complica-
tions associated with perpetual trusts, the trust beneficiaries are better off 
financially with the trust than without it, as long as administrative costs are 
paid from the trust. Whether society as a whole is better (or worse) off is far 
from an easy question and one that merits sustained empirical and theoreti-
cal inquiry. A balanced view of perpetual trusts acknowledges the tension 
between allowing an individual to dispose of property as that individual sees 
fit, on the one hand, and the fact that some beneficiaries will be rewarded for 
a genetic connection, however slight, to a wealthy trust creator, and not due 
to individual merit. 
Most academic critiques of the perpetual trust movement, including Pro-
fessor Waggoner’s, are unnecessarily inflammatory. The perpetual trust 
movement has been called ill advised, loony, and (now) folly. Billions of 
dollars flow to jurisdictions that permit perpetual trusts, suggesting that 
there are plenty of practicing lawyers (and clients) who take a vastly differ-
ent view. Presumably so do legislators in those jurisdictions that have 
experienced job growth in trust-related businesses. It is to those lawmakers 
that Professor Waggoner and other academics should take their critiques of 
perpetual trusts. Doing so acknowledges a divide (how sizeable is not clear) 
between (or perhaps among) the academy, practicing attorneys and the tax-
paying public. Public opinion about perpetual trusts is untested. My 
personal sense is that the majority of Americans would support (or at least 
tolerate) perpetual trusts on the theory that someday the estate tax might, in 
fact, apply to them. That sort of optimism is an article of faith that no 
amount of provocative rhetoric from the academy can shake.  
                                                                                                                      
 32. See, e.g., Tax Literacy Project, Arizona State University Sandra 
Day O’Connor College of Law, https://www.law.asu.edu/programs/programs/taxlaw/ 
taxliteracyproject.aspx. 
